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Mental schemas exert top-down control on information processing, for instance
by facilitating the storage of schema-related information. However, given capacity-
limits and competition in neural network processing, schemas may additionally exert
their effects by suppressing information with low momentary relevance. In particular,
when existing schemas suffice to guide goal-directed behavior, this may actually
reduce encoding of the redundant sensory input, in favor of gaining efficiency in task
performance. The present experiment set out to test this schema-induced shallow
encoding hypothesis. Our approach involved a memory task in which faces had to be
coupled to homes. For half of the faces the responses could be guided by a pre-learned
schema, for the other half of the faces such a schema was not available. Memory
storage was compared between schema-congruent and schema-incongruent items.
To characterize putative schema effects, memory was assessed both with regard to
visual details and contextual aspects of each item. The depth of encoding was also
assessed through an objective neural measure: the parietal old/new ERP effect. This
ERP effect, observed between 500–800 ms post-stimulus onset, is thought to reflect the
extent of recollection: the retrieval of a vivid memory, including various contextual details
from the learning episode. We found that schema-congruency induced substantial
impairments in item memory and even larger ones in context memory. Furthermore, the
parietal old/new ERP effect indicated higher recollection for the schema-incongruent
than the schema-congruent memories. The combined findings indicate that, when
goals can be achieved using existing schemas, this can hinder the in-depth processing
of novel input, impairing the formation of perceptually detailed and contextually rich
memory traces. Taking into account both current and previous findings, we suggest
that schemas can both positively and negatively bias the processing of sensory input.
An important determinant in this matter is likely related to momentary goals, such
that mental schemas facilitate memory processing of goal-relevant input, but suppress
processing of goal-irrelevant information.
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Highlights
– Schema-congruent information suffers from shallow encoding.
– Schema congruency induces poor item and context memory.
– The parietal old/new effect is less pronounced for schema-congruent items.
– Schemas exert different influences on memory formation depending on current
goals.
Keywords: episodic memory, schemas, EEG, congruency, old/new effect
INTRODUCTION
A hierarchical organization with feedforward and feedback
connectivity between hierarchical layers is pervasive throughout
the nervous system (Felleman and Van Essen, 1991; Rockland
et al., 1997). In this organization, interactions between
feedforward and feedback activity determine what is represented
at any given level. The feedback activity in the network is
thought to bias competitive processing in line with prior
information, thus biasing attention, as well as inferences about
the sensory input (Felleman and Van Essen, 1991; Rockland
et al., 1997; Markov and Kennedy, 2013). At the highest level
of the processing hierarchy such prior information consists of
schemas: generalized, higher-level constructs that encompass
configurational (associative) similarities across events, rather
than the specificity that makes those events unique (for other
definitions, see Fiske and Linville, 1980; Ghosh and Gilboa,
2013 or van Kesteren et al., 2013). It is thought that such
schemas are extracted across experiences through a hippocampo-
neocortical dialogue (Sweegers et al., 2014). A number of
recent studies have addressed the influence of such schemas,
plausibly stored at the level of distributed neocortical networks,
on the encoding and consolidation of hippocampus-dependent,
episodic memories (Tse et al., 2007, 2011; van Kesteren et al.,
2010, 2013; Sweegers et al., 2014). Overall, these studies find
that schemas aid the storage of schema-congruent information.
This means that memory for items that are in line with, or that
can be related to a schema are better memorized than items
that are incongruent to the schema. One of the mechanisms
underlying this memory benefit may regard the acceleration of
hippocampus-dependent consolidation mechanisms (Tse et al.,
2007; McClelland, 2013).
In the experiments thus far, memorizing the so-called
‘‘schema-congruent’’ items was typically rewarding. That
is, memorizing the specifics of the individual items served
the pursuit of an internal goal. For example, in a rat study,
extra food was delivered when these items were retrieved
(Tse et al., 2007), and motivation was boosted in a human
study through announcement of an upcoming memory test
(van Kesteren et al., 2013). It has not been investigated
how memory formation proceeds when the storage of
new schema-congruent input is redundant or irrelevant,
given the goal at hand; that is, when behavior in pursuit of
the goal can fully depend on existing schemas, without an
important benefit from storing individual schema-congruent
items. Given competitive principles in neural processing,
mental schemas may then lead to shallow encoding of
goal-irrelevant information, thus increasing behavioral
speed and preserving processing capacity for more relevant
computations.
Many studies support the notion that shallow encoding
leads to qualitatively poor memory traces, holding few visual
details and contextual aspects from the learning period. In
such studies encoding strength has been manipulated through,
for instance, stimulus presentation time (Vilberg and Rugg,
2009), encoding task (Craik and Tulving, 1975), attention at
encoding (Craik et al., 1996; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2003) or
the number of stimulus repetitions (Nelson, 1977; Rugg and
Doyle, 1994). The influence of such encoding manipulations
on memory is also reflected in the electroencephalography
(EEG) during memory retrieval. In particular, in the parietal
old/new effect: an event related potential (ERP) effect,
occurring between 500 and 800 ms after stimulus onset
over parietal areas of the scalp (Allan et al., 1998; Friedman
and Johnson, 2000; Yonelinas, 2002). This ERP effect reflects
higher EEG amplitudes evoked by correctly recognized old
items than by correctly rejected new items (Parker et al.,
2003). Importantly, the aforementioned studies on encoding
strength manipulations have shown that only vivid memories,
containing rich contextual detail from the learning period
(created under deep encoding conditions), elicit this effect,
whereas memories that hold little contextual detail (created
under shallow encoding conditions) do not. In other words:
the presence of this ERP is thought to reflect recollection: the
ability to retrieve source information from the study episode
(Wilding, 2000; see Yonelinas, 2002 for a review on recollection
processes). If schemas induce shallow encoding, visual detail
and context memory will suffer and the parietal ERP will be
diminished.
A previous study in our lab (Sweegers and Talamini, 2014)
that investigated the formation of schemas from episodic
memory provided some first support for schema-induced shallow
encoding. We found that the extraction of associative regularities
from the learning material (associative exemplars) negatively
influenced the formation of detailed memory traces for the
individual exemplars, reducing the incorporation of regularity-
irrelevant details. In the present experiment we build upon this
finding by having subjects now learn a regularity structure, or
schema, before encoding. The aim is to study the influence of
existing mental schemas on the encoding of new information.
To address this issue, we had subjects perform a task in
which faces had to be associated to a limited set of homes
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(a house, a caravan, a tent, etc.). Before encoding, subjects
learned a schema consisting of several rules regarding the relation
between certain combinations of facial features and particular
homes (for example: stout faces with no headwear go with the
caravan). During encoding, a schema of this sort predicted the
corresponding home for half of the faces, whereas the other
half was randomly assigned to non-schema homes. Subjects
learned to pick the corresponding home for each face. The
rationale was that the schemas would hamper the formation of
a detailed memory representation for the congruent items, as
there was, in theory, no need to create memory representations
of these items to perform the task at hand. Shortly after
encoding we assessed the storage of visual detail by testing face
recognition against highly similar lures and new faces, under
EEG recording. We expected recognition performance to be
inferior for schema-congruent faces as compared to schema-
incongruent ones. For the EEG analysis, we focused on the
parietal old/new effect. We hypothesized that this ERP effect
would be less pronounced in the schema-congruent condition
than the schema-incongruent condition, reflecting the retrieval
of contextually poor memories for schema-congruent items.
Finally, we tested context memory behaviorally, as indexed by
memory for the location of the home that was coupled to each
face during encoding. Also here, we expected performance to
be lower for schema-congruent items than schema-incongruent
items.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
Fifty-four subjects gave written informed consent and received
either course credits or financial compensation for participation
in this experiment, which was approved by the local ethics
committee. Six subjects were excluded from the experiment
as they did not reach the pre-set number of trials during the
practice session (see below). Another twelve were excluded from
the EEG analyses due to technical problems (3), having fewer
than 10 artifact-free trials per condition (3) or not showing
the schema manipulation in their behavioral responses (6, see
below). Behavioral analyses were thus performed on 48 subjects
(14 males, mean age 20.60, SD = 1.62); EEG analyses on 36
subjects (11 males, mean age 20.58, SD = 1.61).
Overview
The following gives an overview of the experimental design;
please see the sections below for methodological details. The
experiment was spread across two consecutive days. On day 1,
subjects were familiarized with the face-home task and asked to
memorize several rules regarding combinations of facial features
and homes, which together made up the schema. On day 2,
allowing for some consolidation of the schema, subjects took part
in the learning session. This entailed learning 72 associations
of faces with homes. Half of the associations were congruent
with the schema; the other half was random. After the learning
session, subjects were prepared for EEG recording. In the ensuing
test phase, recognition memory for both the schema-congruent
and the schema-incongruent faces was assessed under EEG
recording. Finally, context memory was assessed by asking
subjects to pick the location of the home that belonged to the
face in the learning phase.
Stimuli
Grayscale pictures of emotionally neutral faces were created
using Faces TM software (Biometrix, 2003). The faces varied
on several non-critical features. However, three systematically
manipulated, binary features occurred in each face: faces were
either: (1) young adult or aged; (2) slender or stout and had
either; (3) headwear (caps, hats or headbands) or no headwear.
These critical facial features could come in various forms (e.g.,
different types of headwear, wrinkle patterns, etc.), contributing
to the perceptual distinctiveness of the faces (see Figure 1).
Six out of the eight possible three-way combinations of these
features were selected for use in the experiment. Each of
these six face categories was thus characterized by a unique
combination of three critical features. However, for each face
category just 2 (out of the 3) critical features sufficed to
distinguish that category; this 2-feature combination did not
occur in any other category (this circumstance is intrinsic
to the systematic counterbalancing of critical features during
item construction). For each of these six face categories 24
faces were created. Twelve faces from each category (72 in
total) were used in the learning phase. With photo-editing
FIGURE 1 | Example of a schema. Subjects were asked to memorize a
schema such as this one before the start of the practice session on day 1. The
schema taught them that a certain type of faces was always connected to the
same home. In this particular example, “stout and no headwear” faces were
always coupled to the caravan. The castle and the church also had a certain
type of faces coupled to them. The figure shows six faces that could be
coupled to the caravan (all stout and no headwear). Note that although all face
examples are from the same face category, they are perceptually quite
different.
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software (Adobe Photoshop), these 72 faces were slightly
modified to create 72 additional lure faces (changes mainly
involved the size and shape of the eyes, nose and mouth).
In the face recognition test we presented subjects with 216
faces: the 72 faces from the learning phase, the 72 similar
lures and the remaining 72 original faces (appointed as ‘‘new
faces’’). Finally, 24 extra faces (four from each category) were
created with Faces TM software to serve as practice faces for
day 1, and another 10 (from various categories) served as
examples.
Line drawings (six in total) of a house, church, factory, tent,
castle and caravan were created such that face-home associations
could be made. Three of these were appointed as ‘‘schema-
congruent homes’’, meaning that all 12 faces associated with
that home belonged to the same face category. The other three
homes were ‘‘schema-incongruent homes’’ and the faces in the
three remaining face categories were randomly assigned to these
homes. Thus, only for three homes, the associated faces could
be predicted from the schema: the unique combination of two
facial features that occurred in a particular face category fully
determined with which home it was paired.
The assignment of homes and face categories to either the
schema-congruent or schema-incongruent condition was semi-
randomized across subjects.
Day 1: Schema Learning and Practice
After arriving at the lab, subjects received a sheet of paper
with the schema and were asked to memorize it. They were
informed that the schema would greatly aid in connecting the
faces to the homes in an upcoming memory task and that
they should use the schema whenever possible. The practice
phase followed, in which subjects had to associate 24 faces,
12 schema-congruent and 12 schema-incongruent ones, with
their corresponding homes in two encoding-retrieval cycles.
During an encoding block, each of the 24 faces was presented
for 1 s over a mid-screen fixation cross, then moved to one
of the six homes that were organized hexagonally around
the fixation cross, and stayed there for another 1.5 s (see
Figure 2A). Immediately after each encoding block, a retrieval
block followed, in which subjects were instructed to indicate the
correct home for each face. Faces were presented sequentially,
for 2 s each, over the fixation cross. Subjects used a joystick to
move the cursor from the fixation cross to the selected home
and confirmed their choice with a button press. In the first
retrieval block, subjects received feedback on each placement:
if the correct home was chosen, the home turned green, and
the face moved to that location; if an incorrect location was
chosen, the home turned red, and the correct home turned
green (see Figure 2B). Subsequently, the subject had to make
a movement to the correct home, after which the face moved
to that home. In the second retrieval block, no feedback was
given, but subjects had to indicate their response confidence
on a five-point scale (1 = low to 5 = high; see Figure 2C).
The order of the faces was randomized over blocks and over
subjects.
Importantly, there was no systematic relation between homes
and screen locations. However, for a particular face-home
association the home always appeared on the same location.
Hence, the location of the home can be seen as a contextual aspect
to themore central face-home association that could be implicitly
learned during the task.
At the end of the practice session, subjects needed to have
a good understanding of the task layout. Subjects who did not
pick the correct homes for at least 9 out of 12 schema-congruent
faces and 6 out of 12 incongruent faces were excluded from the
experiment. We reasoned that subjects who did not meet this
criterion did not have a good understanding of the task, which
required switching between schema and non-schema strategies
in order to obtain maximum performance.
Day 2: Learning and Test Phase
Upon arrival at the lab subjects were instructed to learn 72
new face-home associations. They were asked to use, where
possible, the previously learned schema for connecting the 72
new faces with their corresponding homes. Three encoding-
retrieval cycles followed; the first two included feedback, while
the third included confidence rating instead of feedback. Apart
from the stimuli and the number of encoding-retrieval cycles, the
encoding procedure was exactly the same as on day 1 (duration =
45 min). After a 10 min break, subjects were prepared for
EEG recording, which took approximately 1 h. Thereafter they
performed a 30 min surprise face recognition test, under EEG
recording.
During face recognition, the 72 faces from the learning phase,
72 lure faces and 72 new faces were presented, intermingled.
The lure faces were introduced to assess whether subjects’
face memories incorporated sufficient detail to distinguish
between previously seen faces and faces that were very similar.
The new faces were included for the parietal old/new ERP
investigation.
For this task, faces were presented sequentially, in the middle
of the screen, for 750 ms each. Each face was followed by the
question ‘‘Old, lure or new?’’ which appeared for 3 s. Subjects
were instructed to use buttons on the joystick to answer the
question within the 3 s interval. If subjects did not respond within
the allotted time interval an omission was scored. After those 3 s,
subjects made a confidence judgment (self-paced).
After a short break, subjects performed the contextual
memory task, which required them to pick the location of
the home that corresponded to each face. As mentioned
briefly before, the location of the home can be seen as a
contextual aspect to the more central face-home association
that could be implicitly learned during the task. Each of
the 72 learned faces was shown for 2 s in the middle of
the screen, which also showed a hexagonal pattern of six
gray circles, reflecting the positions of the homes during
learning. Subjects responded by selecting one of the gray
circles with the cursor, after which confidence was rated. This
contextual memory task was self-paced and lasted approximately
10 min.
Finally, a questionnaire was administered to assess whether
subjects intentionally encoded the locations of the homes
along with the face-home associations during encoding. In the
current experiment, the location is intended as contextual to the
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FIGURE 2 | Screen shots from the learning phase of the face-to-home association task. (A) Encoding phase: subjects observed the faces moving to their
corresponding home. (B) Retrieval phase with feedback: subjects were asked to select the home that was associated with the face. Feedback was provided by
presenting the wrong home in red, and subsequently the correct home in green. (C) Retrieval phase with confidence rating: subjects were asked to select the home
corresponding to the face and to make a confidence judgment thereafter. The small pink circle is the cursor that the subjects had to move to make their choice.
more central face-home association. Subjects’ intentional use of
location information for task performance would confound the
interpretation of the contextual memory results.
EEG Acquisition and Analyses
EEG was recorded using a 64-electrode ANT Waveguard EEG
cap with, in addition, two mastoid electrodes as reference and
four electrodes for horizontal and vertical electro-oculography
(72-channel Refa DC amplifier (TMS International, Enschede,
Netherlands), sampling rate: 512 Hz, impedance below 20
kΩ). EEG data was analyzed using the EEGLAB toolbox in
Matlab (Delorme and Makeig, 2004). Break periods were
manually removed from the continuous filtered EEG (high
pass filter: 0.1 Hz, notch filter: 50 Hz) and bad channels
were interpolated. Independent Component Analysis (ICA)
was used to remove eye blinks, eye movements, and other
noise components from the continuous EEG data (noise
rejection was based on criteria published by the NBT: www.
nbtwiki.net/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=tutorial:artifacts_2012.pdf).
Next, EEG data from the face recognition test was epoched from
200 ms before stimulus onset (for the baseline correction) to 2 s
post-onset and epochs containing excessive artifacts (>75 µV)
were removed.
For the investigation of the parietal old/new effect we included
old and new items (so no lure items). Importantly, for the old
items, we included only those trials in which subjects gave an
‘‘old’’ or ‘‘lure’’ response, so as to incorporate all recognition
responses, including both detailed and more approximate ones,
in the ERP analyses. For the new items, we included only those
trials in which subjects gave a ‘‘new’’ response (the correct
rejections). This resulted in four conditions of interest: schema-
congruent old faces, schema-congruent new faces, schema-
incongruent old faces and schema-incongruent new faces. Please
note that lure faces were not used for the EEG analyses, but were
included for behavioral analyses only.
The parietal old/new effect was analyzed considering two
regions of interest (ROIs): a left parietal cluster (including P1,
P3, P5, PO3 and CP3) and a right parietal cluster (P2, P4,
P6, P04, CP4; see Yu and Rugg, 2010; Mollison and Curran,
2012; Wolk et al., 2013 for similar cluster-based analyses). Per
subject, EEG data was first averaged across trials in a condition,
and then averaged across the five electrodes in a ROI. Finally,
a single mean amplitude was calculated, by averaging across
the time points within our time window of interest (500–800
ms; Woodruff et al., 2006; Speer and Curran, 2007; Yu and
Rugg, 2010; Mollison and Curran, 2012). These averaged EEG
amplitudes per subject, per condition, per ROI were used for
group-level analyses.
As we were interested in studying the neural correlates of a
potential schema effect, data from subjects that did not show the
schemamanipulation in their behavioral responses was excluded,
in order to improve the signal-to-noise ratio. To quantify the
schema effect on an individual basis, we first summed the correct
identification scores of old and lure faces for each schema
condition separately. Next, the summed score in the schema-
congruent condition was subtracted from the summed score
in the schema-incongruent condition. Thirty-six subjects had
positive difference scores whereas a mere six showed either no
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 5 November 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 629
Sweegers et al. Mental Schemas Hamper Memory Storage
difference or a negative difference score. These six subjects were
excluded from the EEG analysis.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
As the behavioral data was largely non-normally distributed,
Wilcoxon Paired Signed Rank tests were used to compare the
schema-congruent and schema-incongruent conditions. As there
were 36 faces in each condition, this was always the maximum
score.
Face to Home Association
During the learning phase, subjects could make use of the
schema to connect the schema-congruent faces to their homes.
We compared subjects’ performance on schema-congruent and
incongruent items to assess whether the schemas indeed aided
performance. At the end of the learning session, face to home
allocation was superior for schema-congruent faces (mean =
34.65, SD = 1.44) than for schema-incongruent faces (mean =
28.21, SD = 6.86, Z = −5.74, p < 0.001). Subjects also retrieved
the homes for schema-congruent faces faster (schema-congruent
mean = 2965 ms, SD = 526 ms; schema-incongruent mean =
3406 ms, SD = 919 ms; Z = −4.04, p < 0.001) and with
higher confidence (schema-congruent mean = 4.74, SD = 0.35;
schema-incongruent mean = 4.14, SD = 0.56; Z = −5.98, p <
0.001) than those for schema-incongruent faces. As performance
was much higher in the schema-congruent condition, this
convincingly shows that subjects used the schema to their
advantage.
Face Recognition
D’ scores [z (hits) – z (false alarms); Snodgrass and Corwin
(1988) and Wickens (2001)] were used to compare recognition
memory sensitivity between the schema-congruent and schema-
incongruent condition (see Table 1 for the raw data).
Two d′ measures were calculated, one for global recognition
(hits on old items/false alarms on new items) and one for
detailed recognition (hits on old items/false alarms on lures).
We performed a repeated measures ANOVA with factors
MEMORY LEVEL (global, detailed) and SCHEMA (congruent,
TABLE 1 | Average response frequencies for old, similar and new images,
in the schema-congruent and schema-incongruent conditions.
Item type Response given
Old Similar New
Schema-congruent
Old 16.67 (4.43) 12.48 (4.03) 6.38 (3.69)
Similar 7.71 (3.45) 16.79 (5.51) 10.98 (4.70)
New 0.79 (1.17) 4.92 (3.77) 29.75 (4.46)
Schema-incongruent
Old 21.56 (5.75) 11.29 (4.23) 2.52 (2.78)
Similar 8.90 (4.97) 18.94 (5.95) 7.77 (4.51)
New 0.60 (1.05) 4.98 (3.80) 29.71 (4.11)
Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
incongruent) to test the hypothesis that the use of a schema
leads to shallow item encoding. As expected, a main effect
of MEMORY LEVEL was found (F(1,47) = 38.34, p < 0.001),
showing that memory discriminability is better for global
recognition (mean = 2.10, SD = 0.38) than for detailed
recognition (mean = 0.89, SD = 0.38). In addition, a main
effect of SCHEMA was found (F(1,47) = 583.95, p < 0.001;
schema-congruent mean = 1.31, SD = 0.34; schema-incongruent
mean = 1.67, SD = 0.45). Follow-up tests showed that memory
discriminability was much better in the incongruent condition,
both for global recognition (schema-incongruent mean = 2.31,
SD = 0.51; schema-congruent mean = 1.88, SD = 0.40; Z =
−4.58, p< 0.001) and detailed recognition (schema-incongruent
mean = 1.03, SD = 0.50; schema-congruent mean = 0.74, SD =
0.37; Z = −3.92, p < 0.001). Finally, a marginally significant
interaction was found between SCHEMA andMEMORY LEVEL
(F(1,47) = 2.91, p = 0.095), suggesting that it might be possible that
differences between the schema conditions are somewhat larger
for global recognition (mean difference = 0.42, SD = 0.51) than
for detailed recognition (mean difference = 0.30, SD = 0.46).
Together, these findings clearly show that memory
discriminability for schema-congruent items was markedly
inferior to memory for schema-incongruent items.
Contextual Memory
To test the hypothesis that the use of a schema leads to
contextually impoverished memories, we tested whether subjects
could remember where the homes were located during the
encoding session. Subjects were far more accurate in selecting
the corresponding locations for the faces in the incongruent
condition (mean = 19.15, SD = 6.33) than the congruent
condition (mean = 9.60, SD = 3.87; Z = −5.97, p < 0.001).
Moreover, in the incongruent condition, confidence was higher
(schema-incongruent mean: 3.67, SD = 0.72 vs. schema-
congruentmean: 2.84, SD = 0.69; Z =−5.30, p< 0.001) and RTs
were shorter (schema-incongruent mean: 2472 ms, SD = 559 ms
vs. schema-congruent mean: 2638 ms, SD = 765 ms; Z = −2.55;
p = 0.011). These findings provide strong support for the idea
that schema-incongruentmemories were ‘‘contextually richer’’ as
compared to the schema-congruent ones.
The questionnaire results revealed that a few subjects
intentionally encoded the location of the faces during encoding,
even if only for some faces. When excluding all subjects that
reported the use of this feature, schema effects on accuracy and
confidence were still highly significant (both p’s< 0.001).
The combined behavioral results thus show a clear memory
disadvantage for schema-congruent items. This is apparent for
recognition memory of the target items (faces) and even more so
for schema-irrelevant contextual information.
EEG Results
Memory performance suggests that retrieval of schema-
incongruent items might involve more recollection (i.e., retrieval
of contextual details from the learning episode) than retrieval in
the schema-congruent condition.We tested this through analysis
of the parietal old/new ERP effect. We first investigated whether
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there were differences in the average ERP amplitudes (500–800
ms timewindow) for the schema-congruent new and the schema-
incongruent new condition. If these conditions did not differ,
this would allow us to collapse these trials into a single ‘‘new’’
condition to which the ‘‘old’’ conditions could be compared. A
repeated measures ANOVA with factors SCHEMA (congruent
new, incongruent new) and ROI (left parietal, right parietal)
revealed no main effects, nor an interaction (all p’s > 0.10).
Therefore a single ‘‘new’’ condition was created.
Next, we tested our main hypothesis of a more pronounced
parietal old/new effect in the schema-incongruent condition
as compared to the schema-congruent condition (Figure 3).
First we performed a repeated measures ANOVA with factors
CONDITION (congruent old, incongruent old, new) and ROI
(left parietal, right parietal). This yielded a main effect of
CONDITION (F(2,34) = 4.85, p = 0.011) and a CONDITION ×
ROI interaction (F(2,34) = 7.03, p = 0.002). No main effect of
ROI was found (p > 0.10). The significant effects were further
analyzed through one-way ANOVAs with factor CONDITION
(congruent old, incongruent old, new) for both ROIs separately.
Significant main effects of CONDITION were found bilaterally
(left ROI: F(1,35) = 5.16, p = 0.008; right ROI: F(1,35) = 4.70,
p = 0.012). Follow up t-tests revealed that in the left ROI, both
the schema-congruent old condition (mean = 16.81 µV, SD =
6.22 µV) and the schema-incongruent old condition (mean =
17.03 µV, SD = 6.37 µV) had a significant higher ERP amplitude
than the ‘‘new’’ condition (mean = 15.56 µV, SD = 6.27 µV);
schema-congruent vs. new: t(1,35) = 2.23, p = 0.032; schema-
incongruent vs. new: (t(1,35) = 2.88, p = 0.007). However, the
schema-incongruent and schema-congruent old conditions did
not differ significantly (p > 0.10). Conversely, in the right ROI,
the ERP amplitude in the schema-incongruent old condition
(mean = 16.99 µV, SD = 6.04 µV) was higher than the amplitude
in both the ‘‘new’’ condition (mean = 15.69 µV, SD = 5.81 µV;
t(1,35) = 2.72, p = 0.010) and the schema-congruent old condition
(mean = 16.30 µV, SD = 5.57 µV; t(1,35) = 2.31, p = 0.027). The
schema-congruent old condition did not differ from the ‘‘new’’
condition (p> 0.10).
It can thus be concluded that the parietal old/new effect
was more pronounced for the schema-incongruent condition
than the schema-congruent condition in the right parietal
region (see also the topographical map in Figure 3B, which
shows that the difference between the incongruent old and
congruent old conditions is, indeed, distributed around the right
parietal ROI). These findings support the notion that schema-
incongruent memories were contextually richer than schema-
congruent memories.
Correlations
As explained previously, the parietal old/new effect is thought
to reflect the retrieval of a vivid memory trace, including
contextual information from the study episode. This measure
might, therefore, be expected to correlate with subjects’ context
memory scores. Such a correlation would strengthen the notion
that the ERP effects described in the previous section indeed
reflect differences between conditions with regard to contextual
memory retrieval.
We correlated the average ERP amplitudes in the schema-
incongruent old and schema-congruent old condition with the
contextual memory scores (i.e., memory for the location of the
home). A significant correlation was found in the incongruent
condition where average EEG amplitude in the right ROI
correlated with contextual memory scores (r(34) = 0.392, p =
0.018; see Figure 4). In the left ROI, a similar, marginally
significant correlation was found (r(34) = 0.324, p = 0.054).
The average amplitudes in the congruent old condition did
not reveal any significant correlations with context memory (all
p’s> 0.10).
DISCUSSION
The present study set out to test whether schemas induce
shallow encoding of goal-irrelevant information. The results
confirm our hypothesis: both item and context memory accuracy
were strongly reduced in the schema-congruent condition.
Moreover, recollection-related ERP amplitudes were larger
for the schema-incongruent condition as compared to the
schema-congruent condition, further supporting the hypothesis
that memories for schema-congruent items are contextually
impoverished.
In the present paradigm, each face stimulus was presented
multiple times during the learning phase, and some level
of attention to the face was always needed to select the
corresponding home. These paradigm characteristics,
considering also the fast processing of face stimuli by our
brain (Itier and Taylor, 2004; Pegna et al., 2004), allowed,
in theory, for the formation of robust memory traces for
faces in both schema conditions. Still, large differences were
observed between memory for the schema-congruent and
schema-incongruent faces. In the face recognition test, the
schema-congruent faces were less likely to be recognized, and
were more often falsely endorsed as new.With regard to memory
for contextual aspects of the learning episode, the difference
between the schema conditions was even higher. It thus appears
that the use of schemas strongly impairs memory formation,
which is intriguing given the ample opportunity subjects had to
form strong memory traces.
The ERP results provide further support for differences
in memory quality between the schema conditions. We
investigated the parietal old/new effect, which is believed to
reflect recollection: the ability to retrieve source information
from the study episode (Wilding, 2000). This ERP effect is
generally most pronounced over parietal electrode sites and may
be left lateralized (Schloerscheidt and Rugg, 1997; Wilding, 2000;
Finnigan et al., 2002) or bilateral (Marzi and Viggiano, 2010;
Curran and Doyle, 2011).
In the present study, the schema-congruent faces elicited a
left-lateralized ERP effect, whereas the effect was bilateral in
the schema-incongruent condition. Indeed, in the right parietal
region the schema-incongruent ERP amplitude was significantly
higher than the schema-congruent one. We like to speculate
that this difference reflects the stronger recollection in the
schema-incongruent condition. This notion is strengthened
by the positive correlation between average ERP amplitude
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Line graphs show average ERP waveforms for the schema-incongruent, schema-congruent and new condition, for the left (upper part) and right
(lower part) parietal ROI. The dotted circles represent the time window for the parietal old/new effect (500–800 ms post-stimulus onset). Bar graphs on the right show
ERP amplitudes averaged across this time window, for each condition. (B) Topographic maps of amplitude differences between the congruent old vs. new condition
(left), incongruent old vs. new condition (middle) and incongruent old vs. congruent old condition (right).
in the schema-incongruent old condition, especially on the
right side, and the availability of spatial context memory.
In fact, as spatial information processing tends to be largely
lateralized to the right hemisphere (Smith et al., 1996; Corballis,
1997; Shulman et al., 2010), the right-sided ERP difference
between the two schema conditions may (at least in part)
reflect superior spatial memory availability in the incongruent
condition.
FIGURE 4 | Correlation between scores on the contextual memory task
in the incongruent condition (X-AXIS) and EEG amplitude for the
schema-incongruent old faces during the recognition task (Y-AXIS).
The current findings extend previous work from our lab
that showed poor memory for visual details when regularities
can be extracted across the material to be learned (Sweegers
and Talamini, 2014). In that study, the negative influence on
storage of arbitrary (schema-irrelevant) stimulus aspects may
have been related to the process of regularity extraction. We
now show that such negative effects on memory encoding
also occur when a pre-established schema is used. Thus,
at least part of the effect is related to schema use, rather
than schema formation. We, moreover, now show that such
regularities, or schemas, also impair context memory retrieval,
and that this is evidenced by changes in the underlying neural
networks.
So how do schemas exert these negative effects on memory
formation? In the present study, schemas appeared to
particularly alter memory processing during the encoding
phase, as poor memory for schema-items was already
evident shortly after learning. This was also the case in
our previous study (Sweegers and Talamini, 2014), which,
in addition, showed similar retention of visual detail for
schema-congruent and incongruent items during a 4 h post-
encoding interval. Schema effects on retrieval processes are
unlikely to have contributed importantly to the findings, as
the adopted recognition task places relatively low demands
on retrieval processes. Moreover, possible schema effects
on response bias were accounted for by using, as our main
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memory measure d′, which is corrected for such bias.
Taken together, these findings suggest negative schema
effects come about during memory encoding and/or very
early consolidation, probably through top-down attentional
modulation.
Importantly, our findings indicate that schemas exert
their influence on memory not only through facilitation of
information storage, as shown previously, but also through
suppression thereof. They show that such suppression occurs for
schema-related information that is irrelevant to the pursuit of
momentary goals. Importantly, this highlights the notion that
schemas direct attention and learning in relation to momentary
goals.
When such goals require memorizing novel input, schemas
may help to direct attention to the relevant input and provide
the background knowledge necessary for fast interpretation and
storage of that input. For example, it has been shown that after
extensive training on various flavor-place associations, rats can
acquire a new association in a single trial (Tse et al., 2007). In
another study, schema knowledge regarded the types of fabric
generally used to make particular products (van Kesteren et al.,
2010). Here, it was found that such a schema greatly aided
in memory formation for congruent product-fabric pairs. In
both the rat and the human study, memorizing the individual
schema-related novel items was highly relevant in relation to
task goals, suggesting that schemas help memory storage in such
situations.
There are, however, also situations where schemas can
sufficiently inform goal-directed behavior, so that memorizing
novel input is not directly necessary. Here, schemas appear
to hamper memory storage, even of material that is directly
task-related. Such a mechanism might be expected to have
considerable evolutionary benefit, preventing the storage
of redundant information and sparing processing capacity
for more important computations. Indeed, we propose the
combined findings regarding schema effects on learning are
best understood in terms of interactions between schemas
and active goals steering attention and influencing memory
processing. Thus, not only stimulus novelty (in relation
to the schema), but also stimulus relevance (in relation
to current goals) will influence the level of encoding. In
short, depending on momentary goals, schemas may exert
different influences on memory formation, steering attention
so as to promote the efficient use of information processing
capacity.
Interactions between schemas and momentary goals, as
investigated by us, have not received much attention previously.
However, several other factors influencing schema effects on
memory have been identified. These factors are of considerable
importance in understanding the variable effects of schemas on
memory in different situations and are hence briefly discussed
hereafter (see Stangor and McMillan, 1992, for a detailed
account).
First and foremost, a considerably body of evidence (e.g.,
Pezdek et al., 1989; Neuschatz et al., 2002; Porubanova
et al., 2014), amongst which a meta-analysis (Stangor and
McMillan, 1992) suggests that schemas influence memories
in two basic ways: on the one hand, a relation between a
schema and an item will aid the retrieval thereof, but also
induce a tendency to report schema-congruent items as having
been seen (false memories). These effects act at the level of
memory search and retrievability of the item. Accordingly, the
way in which memory is cued (i.e., the retrieval paradigm)
plays a role. Indeed, this effect is particularly apparent when
schema information is used to cue the target memory. In
view of the above, studies specifically addressing effects of
schemas on memory encoding should always use measures
corrected for response bias (unfortunately, this is not always the
case).
Studies that do not correct for this response bias tend
to find better memory for schema-congruent than schema-
incongruent items. Importantly, however, studies that correct
for this response bias typically find better memory for
schema-incongruent than schema-congruent information,
both for recall and recognition sensitivity measures, such
as d′ (Stangor and McMillan, 1992). The benefit for
schema-incongruent effects is thought to be induced by
the relative novelty of the incongruent item, which favors
synaptic plasticity and learning. In other words, this effect
is related to effects of schemas on encoding, rather than on
retrieval.
Several variables have been shown to modulate the above
schema effects. One of these is the strength of the top
down expectancy generated by the schema (the strength of
the expectancy used to guide information processing) and
the extent to which the bottom up, sensory data driven
information deviates from the expectancy. The size of this
relative novelty signal, or ‘‘prediction error’’ (Friston, 2005;
Henson and Gagnepain, 2010), is thought to determine the
extent of learning in neural networks, through modulation
of acetylcholine (Hasselmo et al., 1996; Meeter et al., 2004).
So, dependent on the size of the prediction error (and the
balance with other factors modulating the schema effect) there
may a relative encoding advantage for schema-incongruent
compared to schema-congruent items (see van Kesteren et al.,
2012 for an elaborate discussion). An important consideration
in this respect is that schemas learned in the laboratory
(used in most recent studies) may induce a relatively weak
expectancy compared to schemas developed through real
life experience, such as various social and cultural schemas
(used in many older studies). Also, in many of the older
studies ‘‘schema-incongruence’’ refers to new information being
discordant with a schema-based expectation (e.g., a person
in a swim suit sitting in a court of law); while in several
recent studies, including our own, it refers to items bearing
no relation to the schema (i.e., schema-irrelevance). As such,
novelty-related schema effects might, in recent experiments,
play a relatively lesser role than in some of the older
literature.
At the neural level, schemas are thought to involve a
network incorporating the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and
the hippocampus. During schema formation, the interaction
between these two regions appears crucial (van Kesteren et al.,
2013; Sweegers et al., 2014), biasing consolidation towards
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the regularities across hippocampus-dependent memories. Once
schemas have been formed, further encoding of new schema-
congruent information seems to particularly involve the
mPFC, rather than the hippocampus (van Kesteren et al.,
2013).
The neural underpinnings of schema-induced memory
suppression have thus far remained undiscussed. We propose
that these impairments are related to hippocampal network
shifts between encoding and retrieval mode, which appear
to be driven by the relative novelty of the hippocampal
input and mediated by acetylcholine levels. Whereas a highly
novel stimulus puts the hippocampus in encoding mode,
familiar input, instead, shifts hippocampal dynamics to retrieval
mode, in which little learning occurs (Hasselmo et al., 1996;
Meeter et al., 2004; Wittmann et al., 2007; Schomaker and
Meeter, 2012). Depending on goal-relevance, schemas may
either bias attention, and therewith item processing, towards
the similarities with the schema (when the schema suffices
for goal achievement) or towards the unique aspects, that
is, the dissimilarities to the schema (when these aspects
of the stimuli are goal-relevant). In the former case, item
information reaching the hippocampus would be relatively
familiar, setting the hippocampus to retrieval mode. In the
latter case, however, hippocampal input would contain more
novel information, driving the system towards encoding
mode.
A point of consideration in our study is whether the 24 h
consolidation period following learning of the regularity
schedule (with pairings of facial features to homes) is
sufficient to allow for the build-up of a schema. Whereas
various studies suggest that full hippocampo-cortical
consolidation may take from several days up to several
weeks (Scoville and Milner, 1957; Zola-Morgan and Squire,
1990; Bontempi et al., 1999; Talamini and Gorree, 2012),
there is considerable literature showing that consolidation
effects can be observed within the first 24 h post-encoding.
Indeed, such effects have been observed at the level of
molecular trace stabilization (Kandel, 2001), system-level
recoding (Takashima et al., 2009) and behavior (Stickgold
and Walker, 2007). Moreover, a previous study in our lab
has shown that generalization of memorized items, which
is plausibly involved in schema formation, can also be
observed after an interval of a mere 4 h post-encoding
(Sweegers and Talamini, 2014). We are therefore convinced
that the time-window that is used in the present study
allows for sufficient consolidation of the new schema to
study the effects of congruency and incongruency upon new
encoding.
CONCLUSION
Schemas should not always be considered beneficial for
learning and memory. Namely, when the storage of schema-
congruent input serves no direct personal goal, schemas
may in fact reduce the detailed processing of such input.
Whereas the adaptive value of such a mechanism is likely
related to information selection in relation to relevance for
survival, an exaggerated or undue influence of schemas on
information processing might counteract the flexible adaptation
of already stored information. Future research should try
to come to a better understanding of the circumstances
under which schema use should be emphasized or rather
avoided.
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